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We consider a model of financial contagion in a bipartite network of assets and banks
recently introduced in the literature, and we study the effect of power law distributions
of degree and balance-sheet size on the stability of the system. Relative to the bench-
mark case of banks with homogeneous degrees and balance-sheet sizes, we find that if
banks have a power-law degree distribution the system becomes less robust with respect
to the initial failure of a random bank, and that targeted shocks to the most specialised
banks (i.e. banks with low degrees) or biggest banks increases the probability of observ-
ing a cascade of defaults. In contrast, we find that a power-law degree distribution for
assets increases stability with respect to random shocks, but not with respect to tar-
geted shocks. We also study how allocations of capital buffers between banks affects the
system’s stability, and we find that assigning capital to banks in relation to their level
of diversification reduces the probability of observing cascades of defaults relative to
size based allocations. Finally, we propose a non-capital based policy that improves the
resilience of the system by introducing disassortative mixing between banks and assets.
Keywords: Contagion; Systemic risk; Network Models.
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1. Introduction
Financial institutions are increasingly diversifying their balance sheet across sev-
eral asset classes in order to reduce the idiosyncratic component of their portfolio
risk. This has led to increased global connectivity in the portfolio holdings across
several institutions [4, 31]. However, recent studies including [36, 22, 35, 14, 3, 15]
have shown that while increased interconnectivity can help diversify risk across
the system, it also serves as a contagion propagating and amplification mechanism
whenever a crisis is underway. This was partly the reason American International
Group (AIG) was bailed out during the financial crisis as many of the biggest fi-
nancial institutions had become exposed to it via derivative contracts ([40] provides
more details). Financial institutions are connected directly via inter-institutional
lending (e.g. interbank and repo transactions) and also indirectly through similar
asset investments such as connections arising from overlapping portfolios. However,
the former has drawn the most attention in the literature. Significant effort has
been for instance devoted to studying the role of counterparty and roll-over risks in
propagating contagion [22, 35, 21, 5, 3, 14, 2], and to understanding the impact of
different interbank network topologies on the resilience of the financial system [41,
30, 4, 33, 23]. Other studies have focused on the effect that agents’ strategic choices
have on the systemic stability (see for instance [6]), or on the characterization of
feedback loops between the macroeconomy and the financial system [1, 25].
Recently, academics and policymakers have begun paying close attention to the
risk posed by indirect connections associated with overlapping portfolios [28, 15,
24]. These connections provide a contagion channel for the propagation of mark-
to-market portfolio losses to one or more financial institutions due to depression
in asset prices resulting from fire sales by a distressed institution holding the same
assets. In some cases, these losses may be sufficient to cause additional institutions
to become distressed thereby resulting in more rounds of asset fire sales and further
depression in asset prices. The 2007 quant crisis, for instance, was caused by a
similar scenario in which the fire sales liquidation of the portfolio of one equity
hedge fund depressed prices of assets held by other funds causing them to embark
on additional rounds of selling which depressed asset prices even further and resulted
in large portfolio losses (see [32] for an elaborate discussion). The existing literature
on overlapping portfolios have only considered bank interlinkages in the context of
a single asset [18, 36, 22, 3]. However, [15] have recently generalised the fire sales
model introduced in [18] to the case of many assets. They characterised the stability
of the financial system in terms of its structural properties including average degree,
market crowding, leverage and market impact using a bipartite financial network
model in which the contagion channel is formed through local portfolio overlaps
between banks with homogeneous degrees.
The analysis of Ref. [15] has been carried out for the case of Erdo˝s-Renyi net-
works and banks with the same size, but in fact empirical studies [26, 11, 34, 19]
show that real financial networks of common portfolio holdings and balance sheet
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size distributions are more heterogeneous. Specifically, they provide evidence of
power laws in these distributions. Therefore, we consider the model of Ref. [15] and
analyze the effect of power law distributions of banks’ size and degree on the sta-
bility of the system. We refer to banks with low degrees as specialised while those
with high degrees are said to be diversified. In this way, we are able to distinguish
between the systemic risk contribution of different categories of banks ranging from
very specialised to very diversified banks. In this vein, our work builds on previous
analysis by [30, 33, 14] on the impact of heterogeneity on the interbank network.
While these previous works considered the effect of heterogeneity on the stability of
interbank lending networks, here we focus on indirect connections due to overlap-
ping portfolios. Furthermore, we study the effectiveness of various regulatory capital
policy models guided by the intuition developed from the systemic risk contribu-
tion of the different types of banks. Finally, we consider the possibility of improving
systemic stability by introducing structural correlation into the network without
imposing new capital requirements.
The model used for our simulations belongs to the same class of contagion mech-
anisms used extensively in the literature of counterparty network models [36, 43,
22]. In a nutshell, the system is exogenously perturbed and the resulting impact is
recursively propagated through the network until no new default is observed. This
feedback mechanism is essentially driven by asset devaluations based on a market
impact function that revalues an asset with respect to its traded volume [9, 10].
Our goal is to understand the impact of heterogeneity in the portfolio structure of
banks on financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios. As such, we abstract
from strategic processes used by banks in choosing a particular portfolio struc-
ture as in [44], who show using a microfounded model that in equilibrium the risk
of joint liquidation motivates investors towards heterogeneous portfolio configura-
tions. Moreover, a mechanistic approach keeps the model general enough for stress
testing real financial systems by calibrating the model. A further assumption is that
of passive portfolio management so as to keep the dynamics simple (i.e. banks do not
deleverage or rebalance their portfolios during a crisis). In this sense, a bank’s port-
folio remains fixed until it becomes liquidated whenever it defaults. This assumption
can be justified from the fact that most financial markets are illiquid relative to the
positions held by large institutions such that whenever a crisis is underway, banks
usually have insufficient time to deleverage until they become insolvent (see [15] for
an elaborate discussion).
Our stress tests reveal that heterogeneous bank degrees and sizes make the sys-
tem more unstable relative to the homogeneous benchmark case with respect to
random shocks but not with respect to targeted shocks. In contrast, heterogeneity
in asset concentrations makes the system more resilient to random shocks but not
with respect to targeted shocks. We then proceeded to study possible capital policy
models guided by these results and find that a regulatory policy that assigns capital
to the most specialised banks performs better than random assignments when the
average degree is high. Moreover, diversification is a more significant factor than
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size in improving the financial system’s resilience with capital based policies. The
insights we develop can be used to address one of the major drawbacks of the Basel
accords in ignoring the role of diversification for setting capital requirements [17].
An example is the risk weighted capital requirement framework which is heavily
criticised for providing banks with incentives to concentrate in low risk asset classes
such as interbank loans, sovereign debt etc. which not surprisingly turned out to be
at the centre of the 2007 financial crisis [7]. Finally, we investigated the possibility of
improving financial stability with a non-capital based policy that imposes a partic-
ular configuration in the bipartite network and find that disassortative mixing (i.e.
connecting the most specialised banks with the most concentrated assets) increases
the stability of the system.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we outline
the main features of the model. In section 3, we explore the stability impact of
heterogeneous network topology and balance sheet sizes. section 4 provides insights
on the effectiveness of capital based policies and proposes a non-capital based policy
by introducing structural correlations into the bipartite network. Finally, a summary
of our findings is presented in section 5.
2. The Model
In this section we describe the model of Ref. [15], that we will then study in section
3 under different scenarios pertaining to the degree and size distribution of banks.
2.1. Network
We consider a bipartite network of a financial system consisting of N banks and M
assets as shown in Figure 1. A link from bank i to asset j implies that j constitutes
part of the portfolio of bank i. We define ki as the degree (i.e. the total number of
links) of bank i. Hence, the average bank degree is defined as:
µb =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ki (1)
Similarly, we can define the average degree of the assets as:
µa =
1
M
M∑
j=1
li (2)
where, lj is the number of banks holding asset j in their portfolio.
2.2. Balance sheet structure
A bank’s portfolio in the network discussed above consists of investments in non-
liquid assets (e.g. shares in stocks) and liquid assets (e.g. cash). Figure 2 depicts the
general structure of a bank’s balance sheet. The initial total assets held by bank i
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Fig. 1: A Heterogeneous bipartite financial network. Banks are depicted in red
circles while assets are shown in blue. The links of the banks follows a power law
distribution
Assets(A0
i
) Liabilities
Non-liquid
assets Deposits
Liquid assets
e.g Cash
Capital
(1− θ)A0
i
Ci = θA
0
i
E0
i
= γA0
i
Di
Fig. 2: A typical bank’s initial balance sheet structure. The bank holds a fixed
amount of its asset in the form of cash and the value is assumed to remain fixed
throughout the simulation for the purpose of simplicity.
are denoted by A0i . A fraction θ of total assets are liquid assets, which we denote
as Ci = θA
0
i , while the rest is assumed to be uniformly spread across the assets in
the bank’s portfolio. The initial equity is equal to E0i = γA
0
i . In the following, for
consistency with previous work [15, 22], we consider θ = 20% and γ = 4%. Moreover,
reports in [43] suggest that the capital structure of banks in advanced economies
typically conforms with this configuration. We further assume that the remaining
portion of the liabilities side of bank’s i balance sheet comprises customers’ deposits
Di. We define the total asset of bank i at any time t as:
Ati =
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j + Ci (3)
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Where Qij denotes the number of shares of stock j held by bank i and Ci is assumed
to remain fixed throughout the simulation. We define ptj as the price of stock j at
time t such that:
ptj = p
t−1
j fj(x
t
j), (4)
where xtj denotes the quantity of asset j sold at time t. In the model, a bank is
declared insolvent whenever its initial capital endowment E0i is completely eroded
due to losses incurred from the depreciation of its asset values. Hence, the solvency
condition for a bank i is defined as:
A0i −
M∑
j=1
Qijp
t
j − Ci ≤ E0i (5)
2.3. Contagion mechanism
A simulation of the model follows the sequence enumerated below:
(1) Exogenously shock the system at time step t = 0
(2) Check banks for solvency condition as in Equation 5 at each successive time
steps t = 1, 2, ..
(3) Liquidate the portfolios of any newly bankrupt bank and re-compute asset
prices. In order to keep the model simple, liquidated assets are assumed to
be traded with parties outside the banking system.
(4) Terminate the simulation when no new defaults occurs between successive
time steps.
This dynamics is captured by the flowchart depicted in Figure 3
Any new
defaults?
Exogeneous
Shock
Liquidate portfolios &
recompute assets' prices
Check for new
insolvent banks
Terminate
Yes
No
Fig. 3: Flowchart representation of the contagion mechanism. A Bank is only de-
clared bankrupt whenever it becomes insolvent.
2.3.1. Exogenous shocks
We consider two kinds of initial shocks: random and targeted shocks. In a random
shock, a bank or asset is randomly selected and exogenously perturbed while a
specific kind of bank or asset is perturbed in the case of a targeted shock.
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2.3.2. Market impact
We assume a market impact function of the form fj(xj) = e
−αxj as in [22, 3, 18]
such that xj is the liquidated fraction of asset j. The price of asset j is then updated
according to the rule: pj → pjfj(xj). As in [22, 36, 15], we set α = 1.0536 such that
the liquidation of 10% of an asset results in a 10% price drop in the asset’s value.
2.3.3. Systemic stability
We characterise the stability of the financial system in terms of the systemic risk
posed by an exogenous shock. We define systemic risk as the probability that the
number of defaults exceeds a threshold φ. We define φ as 5% of the total number
of banks in the system for consistency with previous work [22, 15].
3. Effect of heterogeneity on contagion properties
In this section, we consider different scenarios to understand the effect of heavy-
tailed distributions of assets and degree on contagion due to overlapping portfolios.
3.1. Heterogeneous bank degrees
We desire to investigate the stability impact of heterogeneity in the degree of banks.
As such, we consider a heterogeneous bipartite financial networks where the degrees
of banks are generated according to a power law distribution i.e. P (k) ∝ k−γ with
γ = 2.5. a. Each bank then forms a link with a random asset until it reaches its
generated degree such that no bank is linked to an asset more than once. This link
formation approach implies that the number of links of the assets follows a Poisson
distribution since every asset has the same probability of being selected. A bank’s
degree can be interpreted as its level of diversification since it denotes the number of
different investments of the bank. We have used the term specialised bank to mean a
bank with focused investments in contrast to a bank holding a diversified portfolio.
Our focus here lies in understanding the systemic risk contribution of different types
of banks ranging from very specialised to very diversified banks without mixing in
the influence of size. This approach mandates an assumption of the same balance
sheet sizes across all banks.
In the left panel of Figure 4, we plot the probability of contagion as a function of
µb when a random bank fails. We compare the unstable region for the system with
heterogeneous bank degrees relative to the homogeneous case. We find that the un-
stable region is wider in the heterogeneous system. The right panel of Figure 4 shows
that this observation is independent of the kind of exogenous shock. In particular,
we plot the contagion probability for the case when an asset is randomly devalued
aWe have chosen this value for γ in order to generate power law distributions where the first
moment is defined and the second is infinite i.e 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3. Moreover, we choose this particular
value for γ to ensure consistency with previous work [14] on counterparty default contagion
December 22, 2016 14:56 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE hop
8 Opeoluwa Banwo, Fabio Caccioli, Paul Harrald, Francesca Medda
and still find that heterogeneity in banks’ degree results in greater instability. A
similar finding is reported by [24], who show that heterogeneity increases aggregate
vulnerability of the financial system to adverse shocks. The existence of a wider
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Fig. 4: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for the case when a ran-
dom bank fails. Red circles: system with heterogeneous bank degrees. Blue squares:
system with homogeneous bank degrees. Right Panel: Contagion probability as a
function of µb for the case when a random asset is devalued. Contagion is worse in
the heterogeneous system irrespective of the kind of exogenous shock. Result refer
to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000
unstable region in the heterogeneous system can be understood by observing that,
contrary to the homogeneous case, the heterogeneous system is characterized by a
few highly diversified banks and many specialized banks. Hence, the probability that
a specialized bank is hit from the initial shock is relatively higher. Consequently,
specialised banks induce higher devaluations on their assets since they hold large
amounts of these assets.
However, this result is in contrast to general reports in the complex networks
literature in which heterogeneous network topology has been shown to create more
stability, for instance, [14] show that heterogeneity in a counterparty network cre-
ates a more robust system relative to the homogeneous case. The reason for this lies
in the fact these previous works have considered a network of direct bilateral expo-
sures. In such case the few hubs (i.e. the most connected nodes) become the most
systemically relevant because they can impact a higher number of counterparties,
whereas in our case the specialised nodes are the most systemically relevant because
they concentrate their investments in specific assets, and have a higher impact of
liquidation on these. This result may shed some light on why specialised institutions
like mortgage banks, building and loan associations, specialist funds etc., who hold
significant amounts of specific assets, should be considered systemically important.
Moreover, it provides further support to the conjecture given by Andrew Haldane,
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the Bank of England’s Chief Economist, in one his speeches that the ”rapid growth
in specialist funds potentially carry risk implications, both for end-investors and
for the financial system as a whole” [27]. Furthermore, [44] also suggests impos-
ing higher diversity requirements on portfolio holdings of financial institutions with
high liquidation risk relative to those with low risk.
In Figure 5, we show the impact of targeted shocks on the stability of the system.
We plot the probability of contagion as a function of µb when the initial shock is
aimed at specific banks. We find that the unstable region is widest when any of the
top 5% most specialised banks is hit while targeted shocks on any of the top 5%
diversified banks results in the smallest unstable region. This can be understood
from the fact that banks hold lesser amounts of specific assets with increasing
degrees since we assume here that all banks are endowed with the same asset sizes.
Hence, targeting shocks at the most diversified banks would effectively close the
fire-sale contagion channel quicker since only small amounts of assets would be
sold, which implies lower price devaluation than the case when banks are randomly
perturbed. However, the reverse is observed when shocks are directed at the most
specialised banks since they hold significant amounts of specific assets and thereby
carry higher liquidation risk. We refer to these banks as ”Too Specialised To Fail”
(TSTF).
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Fig. 5: Contagion probability as a function of µb when banks have heterogeneous
degrees. Blue squares: contagion probability when a random bank fails. Green di-
amonds: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the most specialised
banks. Red circles: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at only the most
diversified banks. The region where contagion occurs is widest when specialised
banks are targeted. Result refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000
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3.2. Heterogeneous asset concentration
In the previous section, the distribution of the banks’ degrees was heavy-tailed, but
degrees of assets (i.e. the concentration of assets) followed a Poisson distribution. In
this section, we turn our attention to the opposite case when the distribution of the
number of banks holding each asset is heavy tailed and the degree distribution of
banks is homogeneous. We follow the approach of the previous section and assume
a power law distribution in the asset concentrations. An asset’s concentration can
be interpreted as the preference of banks towards that asset. Our aim is to study
how this preference structure affects the stability of the entire system.
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Fig. 6: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µa for homogeneous and
heterogeneous distributions of asset concentrations. Blue squares: system with ho-
mogeneous asset concentrations. Red circles: system with heterogeneous asset con-
centrations. A random bank fails in both cases. Introducing heterogeneity into the
distribution of asset concentrations results in a more robust system. Right Panel:
Targeted shocks on a system with heterogeneous asset concentrations. Targeting
concentrated assets amplifies contagion probability. Result refer to 1000 simula-
tions for N = M = 1000
In the left panel of Figure 6, we plot the probability of contagion as a function of
average asset degree for the case when a random bank fails. In contrast to the results
observed for heterogeneous bank degrees, we find that introducing heterogeneity in
the concentration of the assets produces a slightly more robust system relative to
the homogeneous system. This can be understood from the fact that the probability
than a highly concentrated asset is perturbed is relatively low since the scale free
network comprises very few concentrated assets and many less concentrated (i.e.
isolated) ones. This effectively reduces the unstable region since fewer banks are
affected by contagion.
The right panel of Figure 6 shows the impact of targeting initial shocks at any
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of the top 5% most concentrated (i.e. with highest degree) assets. As expected, tar-
geting initial shocks at these highly concentrated assets has the effect of amplifying
contagion since more banks are negatively affected by the initial asset devaluation.
However, the width of the unstable region is essentially the same as in the homoge-
neous system. This is because as soon as banks reach a critical average degree the
exogenous shock is not amplified by the system (irrespective of whether the shock
consists in the initial default of a bank or the initial devaluation of an asset).
3.3. Heterogeneous bank sizes
In the previous sections, we assumed that all banks have the same balance sheet sizes
in order to separate the influence of size from diversification. However, empirical
evidence in the literature clearly suggest that banks also have largely heterogeneous
sizes [8]. For instance, a recent data analysis by SNL Financial shows that the top
5 biggest banks have 44% of the total assets held by banks in the U.S. [39]. Our
aim in this section is to study the impact of this kind of heterogeneity in the size
distribution of banks on the stability of the financial system. To do this, we model
the bank sizes according to a power law distribution i.e. P (A) ∝ A−γ resulting
in the creation of a few banks with significantly larger asset sizes than most banks
whilst abstracting from the influence of diversification by assuming a Poisson degree
distribution.
In the left panel of Figure 8, we plot the probability of contagion as a function
of µb for the case of random bank shocks. We find that the probability of contagion
as a function of µB decays much faster when banks have homogeneous sizes relative
to the heterogeneous case. The following argument provides an intuition to why
this is the case. In the heterogeneous system, the fire sales impact on asset prices is
more severe whenever any of the large banks are hit as these banks hold significant
amounts of their assets relative to the entire system since we have assumed a Poisson
degree distribution. This effectively shifts the critical threshold for which contagion
is no longer possible to the right.
The right panel shows the contagion probability as a function of µb for the case
of initial shocks to specific banks. We observe that the system is significantly more
unstable when exogenous shocks are targeted at any of the top 5% biggest banks
but more stable when the shocks are targeted at any of the top 5% smallest banks.
This follows from the fact that big banks hold comparatively larger amounts assets
for each value of µb relative to other banks, which implies that targeting shocks at
them would cause higher devaluations of the assets they hold, effectively fuelling
the contagion mechanism that leads to a wider unstable region. We refer to these
banks as ”Too Big To Fail” (TBTF).
In summary, the findings of the stress tests conducted in section 3 are the fol-
lowing:
(1) Introducing heterogeneity in the degrees of banks exacerbates the fragility of the
system to random shocks in contrast to [14, 22] who show that a scalefree coun-
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Fig. 7: Left Panel: contagion probability as a function of µb for homogeneous and
heterogeneous distribution of banks’ sizes. Blue squares: system with similar balance
sheet sizes. Red circles: system with heterogeneous balance sheet sizes. The system
is subject to random bank failures in both cases. Contagion probability is wider
in the heterogeneous system relative to the homogeneous case. Right Panel: Tar-
geted shocks on a system with heterogeneous distribution of banks’ balance sheet
sizes. Blue squares: contagion probability when a random bank is perturbed. Red
circles: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the biggest banks. Green
diamonds: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the smallest banks.
Targeting shocks at the biggest bank results in the widest unstable region. Result
refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000.
terparty network results in a more robust system with respect to random shocks.
We find that this result is independent of the type of exogenous shock (i.e. bank
or asset shock). Furthermore, we find that targeting the most specialised banks
makes the system more unstable.
(2) Heterogeneity in asset concentrations improves the resilience of the system to
random shocks in contrast to heterogeneous bank degrees. Moreover, targeting
highly concentrated assets increases the probability of contagion, however the
average degree threshold where contagion dies out is effectively unchanged.
(3) Cascading default stops at r when banks have homogeneous sizes relative to the
heterogeneous case and is greater when exogenous shocks are targeted at the
biggest banks.
4. Policy Impact Analysis
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has precipitated calls for higher regulatory capital
requirements for banks. Although higher capital requirements can improve financial
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stability, they however carry some implicit costs b, namely reduced profitability for
banks and higher lending cost which may have a negative impact on social welfare
[29, 12, 13]. Hence, it is important that new regulatory capital requirements are
assigned to banks in the way that gives the most stable configuration. To this end,
we investigate how the intuition developed from the stress tests in section 3 can
influence capital based regulatory policies. We then propose an alternative non-
capital based policy by studying the structure of the bipartite network.
4.1. Capital based policy
Here, we compare the performance of possible capital policy models following the
intuition developed in section 3. In each model, the same amount of capital χ is
injected into the system. The difference in the policies lies in the way χ is distributed
amongst the banks. In each analysis, we test the response of the system to the initial
default of a random bank.
4.1.1. Targeted versus random
The stress tests done in section 3 suggests that ”Too Specialised To Fail” and ”Too
Big To Fail” banks are systemically important. Hence, it becomes interesting to ask
if assigning capital requirements to only this group of banks can improve financial
stability relative to targeting a random group of banks. We consider two kinds of
targeted policies. In one, we assign the capital equally to only the top 5% most
specialised banks and refer to this policy as TS (Targeted Specialised) while in the
second, which we call TB (Targeted Big), only the top 5% biggest banks are required
to hold more capital. We model a random policy for the purpose of comparison. In
the random policy, 5% of the banks are randomly selected and assigned additional
capital requirements equally.
TS : We now investigate the stability impact of the TS policy relative to the random
policy as such we abstract away from the influence of size by assuming similar bal-
ance sheet sizes across all banks. We show this comparison in left panel of Figure 8
by computing the ratio R of the contagion probability of both policies as a function
of µb such that R = 1 implies similar performance, R > 1 means the TS policy
supersedes the random policy and R < 1 implies that the TS policy outperforms
the random policy. We focus our analysis on only those regions where contagion
occurs in both systems to avoid divisions by zero. The plot suggests that a policy
that focuses on the most specialised banks results in greater stability relative to
a random policy in the region with high values of µb, which is significant from a
policy perspective because real world financial networks are more likely to be in
bThis is based on the assumption that Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold, which essentially
implies that a bank’s capital structure does not affect profit or social welfare in an idealised world
without frictions such as interest payments on debts, taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs [20].
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this region.
The right panel of Figure 8 provides an insight to why the TS policy outperforms
the random policy. It shows the probability that a bank i with degree ki defaults
before the occurrence of contagion. The plot suggest that the specialised banks
are the most likely to default before contagion occurs. As such, it is reasonable to
conjecture that focusing the capital policy on these banks is more likely to increase
the resilience of the system.
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Fig. 8: Left panel: Stability impact of TS policy relative to the random policy
for a system with heterogeneous bank degrees. Dotted line: comparison basis i.e.
R=1. The TS policy produces more stability relative to the random policy for high
values of µb. Right panel: Probability that a bank i with degree ki defaults before
contagion occurs. The most specialised banks have a greater chance of defaulting
before contagion occurs.
TB : We now abstract from heterogeneous degrees and consider only heterogeneous
sizes in order to study the stability impact of the TB policy relative to the random
policy. We show this comparison in left panel of Figure 9 by computing the ratio
R of the contagion probability of both policies as a function of µb such that R = 1
implies similar performance, R > 1 means the TB policy supersedes the random
policy and R < 1 implies that the TB policy outperforms the random policy. The
plot markers oscillate around 1 suggesting that a policy that focuses only on the
biggest banks is not effective.
In order to understand why the TB policy does not perform better than the
random policy, we plot the probability that a bank i with size Ai defaults before
the occurrence of contagion in the right panel of Figure 9 and find that big banks
have a smaller chance of failing before contagion occurs. This implies that allocating
capital requirements to only these banks is likely to be ineffective in the context of
this model.
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Fig. 9: Left panel: Stability impact of TB policy relative to the random policy for
a system with heterogeneous bank sizes. Dotted line: comparison basis i.e. R = 1.
The TB policy appears to be ineffective relative to the random policy. Right panel:
Probability that a bank i with size Ai (shown in log-scale) defaults before contagion
occurs. The biggest banks have a greater chance of defaulting before the occurrence
of contagion.
4.1.2. Diversification versus size
In the previous section, we simplified the model in order to separate the impact of
diversification and size. However, it is also interesting to ask which of the two factors
namely diversification and size is the more significant factor for capital requirement
policies. In order to facilitate this comparison, we introduce heterogeneity into the
degrees and sizes of the banks. The diversification based policy we consider assigns
capital requirements to banks based on their degrees such that banks with higher
degrees are required to hold lesser capital i.e.
i =
1/ki∑
i 1/ki
χ (6)
Where, ki denotes the degree of bank i. While the size based policy allocates capital
requirements to banks based on the size of their balance sheets such that big banks
are required to hold more capital i.e.
i =
Ai∑
iAi
χ (7)
Where, Ai denotes the size of bank i. Consequently, we compute the initial
capital E0i of bank i as E
0
i = E
0
i +i. In Figure 10, we compare the stability impact of
a diversification based policy relative to a size based policy by computing the ratio R
of their respective contagion probabilities as a function of µb such that R = 1 implies
similar performance, R > 1 means the diversification based policy supersedes the
size based policy and R < 1 implies that the size based policy outperforms the
diversification based policy. The figure suggests that assigning capital based on a
December 22, 2016 14:56 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE hop
16 Opeoluwa Banwo, Fabio Caccioli, Paul Harrald, Francesca Medda
bank’s degree supersedes assignment based on size further confirming recent findings
reported by [16].
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Fig. 10: Stability impact of policy based on diversification relative to policy based
on size as a function of µb for a system with heterogeneous sizes and degrees. Using
banks’ diversification levels as a proxy for assigning capital requirements is superior
to using bank sizes.
4.2. Non-capital based policy
From a policy maker’s perspective, it is interesting to ask if there is a network struc-
ture that improves systemic stability without imposing new capital requirements
(see [42] for example)? We address this question by introducing some structural
correlation into the bipartite network. In the subsequent paragraphs, we use the
term ”assortative network” for a bipartite network in which the most diversified
banks hold the most widely held (i.e. concentrated) assets and ”disassortative net-
work” for one in which the most specialised banks hold the most widely held assets
while the most diversified banks hold the least held assets. The correlated networks
are generated based on the algorithm proposed in [37]. The procedure essentially
involves minimising a network cost function until a stationary state using Monte
Carlo simulations. This cost function is defined as:
H(G) = −J
2
N∑
i,j=1
aijkikj (8)
aij
{
0, if i = j
1, otherwise
Where, ki =
∑
j aij and J denotes a control parameter for tuning the level of assor-
tativity i.e. J < 0(J > 0) gives a disassortative (assortative) network respectively
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while J = 0 produces an uncorrelated network.
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Fig. 11: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for different net-
work correlation configurations subject to the initial failure of a random bank. Blue
squares: Uncorrelated network. Red circles: Assortative network. Green diamonds:
disassortative network. The disassortative network gives the most stable configu-
ration, while the assortative network results in the most unstable system. Right
Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for different network correlation
configurations. Again, the disassortative network gives the most stable configura-
tion.
In the left panel of Figure 11, we study the resilience of the system as a function
of µb for the different network configurations for the case when a random bank
fails. The right panel shows the same plot but for the case when a random asset is
devalued. In both cases, we find that the disassortative network produces the most
stable configuration. This is so because in a disassortative network, assets with high
degree are held by the most fragile banks (i.e. banks with low degrees, that are less
diversified). This implies that fire sales impact on the asset prices resulting from the
default of any of these fragile banks would be minimal. However, in the assortative
network, assets with low degrees are held by these fragile banks, which implies that
the fire sales resulting from their default would be much more severe thus leading
to a wider unstable region. This result raises a question of whether it is possible to
implement a structure of incentives that makes the bipartite network disassortative?
For instance, such a scheme is proposed by [38] for reducing the build up of systemic
risk in the financial system.
5. Conclusion
Previous studies on overlapping portfolios have relied on the assumption of homo-
geneity in the degrees and sizes of banks, however, empirical findings show that real
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financial networks deviate from this assumption [26, 11, 8, 34, 19]. In particular,
they provide evidence that bank degrees and sizes follow power law distributions.
In our work, we considered the model recently introduced in [15] and studied the
effect of these features. This approach makes it possible to study the aggregate risk
contribution of different types of banks with varying degrees and sizes. We found
that separately introducing heterogeneity into the degrees and sizes of the banks
widens the unstable region relative to the homogeneous case with respect to the ini-
tial failure of a random bank but not with respect to targeted shocks. In contrast,
heterogeneity in asset concentrations makes the system more resilient to random
shocks but not with respect to targeted shocks.
Based on these intuitions, we proceeded to study possible capital policy models.
Our findings suggest that a regulatory capital policy that assigns capital require-
ments to the most specialised banks performs better than random capital assign-
ments when the network connectivity is high. However, focusing capital require-
ments on only the biggest bank does not appear to be effective relative to random
assignments within the context of the model. Furthermore, we investigated the rel-
evance of using diversification or size in building the capital based policies and
find that the diversification based policy outperforms the size based policy with
increasing network connectivity.
We then proposed a non-capital based policy that improves financial stability
by introducing structural correlation into the bipartite network. Our results suggest
that disassortative mixing (i.e. connecting the most specialised banks with the most
concentrated assets) improves the resilience of the system. This can be understood
from the fact that the fire sales impact of the specialised banks is significantly
reduced due to the smaller quantity of traded shares relative to the entire volume
of the assets.
In an ongoing work, we plan to break away from the mechanistic stress test
models used in this paper and consider a more realistic agent based model in which
negative externalities from overlapping portfolios endogenously evolve. This way we
can implement measures to disincentive banks from structuring their portfolios in
a manner that increases the fragility of the system.
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